Asquith’s flawed Irish compromise

The British prime minister’s delays and indecision ultimately condemned Ireland to partition, writes Ronan Fanning

When Herbert Henry Asquith became Prime Minister on 8 April 1908 his Liberal Party was enjoying its last general election victory ever overall majority in the House of Commons. That enabled the new Prime Minister to do what he most wanted to do about Ireland: nothing.

A barrister by profession, Asquith was not a wealthy man. He never forgot that the split over the first Home Rule Bill in 1886 had condemned the Liberal Party to almost 20 years in the wilderness of opposition. This explains why the guiding principle of his Irish policy from the moment he entered 10 Downing Street until the moment he left it in December 1916 was that Ireland should never again deny him power.

Things changed when the two general elections in 1910, caused by the constitutional crisis over the reduction of the powers of the House of Lords, once more reduced the Liberal Party to dependence on John Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party for its working majority in the House of Commons. The price for the Irish party’s support was a renewed commitment by Asquith’s government to introduce home rule once the obstacle of the inbuilt Unionist majority in the House of Lords had been dismantled.

This seemed to have been achieved by the Parliament Act of 1911. But although the act destroyed the House of Lords’ permanent veto on home rule, it sanctioned a two-year veto. A Home Rule bill could be and was introduced in 1912, but it could not be enacted before the summer of 1914. This created the perfect climate for Asquith’s preference for procrastination. The enforced delay gave concrete expression to his principle of ‘Wait and See’, the phrase he repeatedly used in the House of Commons when asked about his Irish policy.

This also explains what happened on 9 February 1912 when, after the most significant cabinet discussion of Irish policy since Gladstone’s conversion to home rule in 1886, Asquith’s government decided on the terms of the third Home Rule Bill. The pragmatists, the most powerful of whom were David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, proposed the temporary exclusion of Unionist Ulster from the terms of the bill. But Asquith preferred procrastination because he feared that publicly grasping the nettle of partition would so alienate John Redmond and his party that it would put at risk his majority in the House of Commons.

In the end, as the prime minister informed the king, the Cabinet ‘acquiesced’ — that most Asquithian of words — in three conclusions:

• Firstly, that the Home Rule Bill ‘as introduced should apply to the whole of Ireland’;
• Secondly, that the leaders of the Irish Parliamentary Party ‘should from the first be given clearly to understand that the Government held themselves free to make such changes in the Bill as fresh evidence of facts, or the pressure of British opinion, may render expedient’; and

Thirdly, that ‘if, in the light of such evidence or indication of public opinion, it becomes clear as the Bill proceeds that some special treatment must be provided for the Ulster counties, the Government will be ready to recognise that necessity’. The cabinet’s conclusions amounted to a tacit invitation to revolution: the more sedition the Ulster Unionists became, the more persuasive would be the ‘fresh evidence’ and the more likely that ‘public opinion’ would indicate that they must receive ‘some special treatment’. A mass rally in Belfast, on 9 April 1912, when 300,000 Irish Unionists marched in military formation past Andrew Bonar Law (the leader of the Conservative Party) and Edward Carson but was the first of many instalments of such evidence.

Privately, Asquith, like Lloyd George and Churchill, favoured exclusion. Publicly, he was determined to postpone unveiling what he believed was an inevitable compromise until the last possible moment. ‘I have always thought (and said) that, in the end, we should probably have to make some sort of bargain about Ulster as the price of Home Rule,’ he reminded Churchill when the Irish crisis was coming to a head in September 1913. ‘But I have never doubted, that, as a matter of tactics and policy, we were right to launch our Bill on its present lines.’

Asquith, moreover, clearly understood the risks of such a strategy and he spelled them out in a memorandum for the King in the autumn of 1913. After acknowledging that the enactment of the Home Rule Bill in its original form entailed “the certainty of tumult and riot, and more than the possibility of bloodshed” in Unionist Ulster, he went on to paint a much bleaker scenario if the bill were abandoned.

‘If the Bill is rejected or indefinitely postponed, or some inadequate and disappointing substitute put forward in its place, the prospect is, in my opinion, much more grave. The attainment of Home Rule has for more than 30 years been the political (as distinguished from the agrarian) ideal of the Irish people. Whatever happens in other parts of the United Kingdom, at successive general elections, the Irish representation in Parliament never varies...’

It is the confident expectation of the vast bulk of the Irish people that it will become law next year. If the ship, after so many stormy voyages, were now to be wrecked in sight of port, it is difficult to overstate...
the shock, or its consequences. They would extend into every department of political, social, agrarian and domestic life. It is not too much to say that Ireland would become un-governable—unless by the application of forces and methods which would offend the conscience of Great Britain, and arouse the deepest resentment in all the self-governing Dominions of the Crown.

Asquith’s analysis was chillingly prophetic. Within six years nationalist Ireland had taken precisely this path and become un-governable except by the forces and methods applied in 1920-21 by the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries.

The Ulster unionists’ threat of violence bore fruit on 9 March 1914 when Asquith told the House of Commons that his government would exclude Unionist Ulster from the terms of the Home Rule Bill for six years. Edward Carson’s contemptuous dismissal of the change of policy Asquith had imposed upon the hapless John Redmond —‘we do not want a sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years’— disguised his acknowledgement of its larger significance. The partition of Ireland had probably been unavoidable since the cabinet meeting of 6 February 1912; on 9 March 1914 it became inevitable.

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HE compromise that put the Irish problem on ice for the duration of the Great War merely disguised this inevitability. The core of the compromise was Redmond’s proposal that if the government would postpone the introduction of the amending bill providing for Ulster’s exclusion, he would agree to the suspension of the coming into effect of the Home Rule Bill (despite its being immediately put upon the Statute Book) until the amending bill became law.

Put simply, Redmond agreed to the suspension of Home Rule, and Asquith agreed to the suspension of partition. But the announcement of the deal was accompanied by an explicitly partitionist and public assurance from Asquith that ‘the employment of force, any kind of force, for... the coercion of Ulster, is an absolutely unthinkable thing... a thing which we would never countenance.’

The apocalyptic violence of the Great War changed everything in nationalist Ireland. But although the revolutionary nationalists of Sinn Féin swept aside the constitutional nationalists of the Irish Parliamentary party at the 1918 election, one thing had not changed: Eamon de Valera was as impotent as John Redmond to resist the partitionist solution to the Irish problem to which Asquith irrevocably committed the British government.

Ronan Fanning is Professor Emeritus of Modern History at UCD and this article is based on his book ‘Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution 1910-1922’ (London, 2013). His new book ‘Eamon de Valera: A Will to Power’ was published in October.

EDWARD CARSON was born in Dublin in 1854. Having studied law at Trinity College he qualified as a barrister in 1877, rising quickly in the profession. Following his election as an MP for Dublin in 1892, his impressive performances in the House of Commons during the debates on the Second Home Rule Bill earned him celebrity status in Britain. In 1895 he achieved international fame as the prosecutor who secured the imprisonment of Oscar Wilde.

In 1910 Carson became chairman of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party. His new role placed him at the head of the Unionist campaign against the Third Home Rule Bill. Carson was determined to keep Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. He believed that without the industrial and economic power of Ulster, a Home Rule State in Ireland could not function.

Therefore his strategy was to make Home Rule unworkable by co-ordinating a massive campaign of Unionist opposition in the province. He presided over a demonstration in September 1912 when 471,414 people signed the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant or, in the case of women, the Declaration.

Carson is often seen as the man who militarised modern Irish politics, by sanctioning the formation of the paramilitary UVF in January 1913 to resist Home Rule, by armed force if necessary. With the outbreak of the First World War, Carson pledged Unionist support for the British war effort. Unlike John Redmond, he accepted an invitation to enter Asquith’s war-time coalition Cabinet formed in May 1915.

He was appointed Attorney-General of England and, when Lloyd George took over the premiership, First Lord of the Admiralty. Carson grew increasingly disillusioned over the Government’s attempts to find a political settlement to satisfy Nationalist and Unionist aspirations during the Anglo-Irish War.

He was a vehement critic of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and passed over the offer to lead the newly created state of Northern Ireland to his lieutenant, James Craig. He retired to the House of Lords and died in 1935.

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Mini Profile
Edward Carson
BY DR RICHARD McElliGOTT

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